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Introduction 
How do militarily non-aligned member states of the European Union approach European integration in 
defence, in particular the newly established Permanent Structured Cooperation? This is the question 
puzzling the article, which analyses the policies of Sweden and Finland towards the new Common 
Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) and especially the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 
defence, which the participating member states adopted on 11 December 2017. Out of the EU member 
states, only Malta, Denmark and the United Kingdom decided not to join PESCO.  
The period of analysis in this article starts from 2016, which allows examining the debates around the 
most recent defence policy documents in both countries, the Finnish white papers published in 
spring 2016 and 2017 and the Swedish defence reports in January 2017 and May 2019. Other empirical 
material includes government bills and letters, parliamentary debates and committee reports and 
statements on EU defence cooperation from 2016 to September 2019. The present article illustrates that 
militarily non-aligned states do not necessarily have uniform approaches in defence matters; instead, 
Finland and Sweden have framed PESCO differently both before and after its establishment. The article 
argues that the Swedish politicians in favour of PESCO frame the cooperation in terms of Sweden 
receiving more influence in CSDP, whilst the Finnish politicians frame PESCO as creating a European 
security community. The analytical tool informing the analysis lends from frame analysis, especially 
looking at “the ways in which situation-specific framing may contribute to divisions among policy-
relevant actors.”1 
For the sake of brevity, the article utilises the term “military non-alignment” to describe the stances of 
Finland and Sweden, even though both countries often translate their official stances in English as “not 
belonging to a military alliance.” The 2017 Finnish Defence White Paper states: “Finland is a country 
which does not belong to any military alliance,”2 whilst the 2019 Swedish Defence Commission report 
outlines, “Sweden does not belong to any military alliance.”3 
It is fruitful to compare the approaches of the militarily non-aligned states in a changing environment. 
Finland was in the vanguard of establishing PESCO, but also the Swedish parliament approved Sweden 
participating in PESCO with a clear majority, though after a heated debate. The Swedish government 
explicitly framed PESCO to comply with Sweden’s military non-alignment in its Bill to the Swedish 
parliament.4 However, the Finnish Parliament did not hold a similar debate on the matter. Neither the 
government letters, committee documents nor parliamentary debates that touched upon PESCO 
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discussed the relation between PESCO and the Finnish military non-alignment. This suggests that even 
politicians critical of PESCO did not oppose it due to it allegedly violating military non-alignment.  
In addition to an analysis of the framing of PESCO, the article provides an account of the political debates 
related to the dynamics of integration in the field of defence. The aim is to trace justifications for further 
integration in the field of defence and to compare the approaches between national decision-makers in 
the two countries. The references to PESCO were categorised based on the frames in which the views 
appeared, be they in favour or against PESCO. 
Previous studies on Finnish and Swedish military non-alignment mainly focus on the period from the 
late 1990s to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.5 Scholars, however, have hardly analysed the 
contemporary situation and approaches towards PESCO. This may be accounted by the fact that serious 
debates on the topic and the establishment of the cooperation took place only in 2017, as illustrated in 
the following section, which briefly introduces the process leading up to the establishment of PESCO 
and beyond. I then discuss the Swedish and Finnish political debates on PESCO separately and analyse 
the potential reasons for the observed differences. Finally, I present my conclusions on the approaches 
of these two militarily non-aligned states towards European defence cooperation. 
 
Finland and Sweden and the CSDP – from reluctant to active partners 
Both Finland and Sweden reformulated their previous neutrality policy as military non-alignment before 
they joined the European Union in 1995. When the countries joined the EU, they became only observers 
in the defence alliance attached to the EU, the Western European Union (WEU), and Finland and Sweden 
did not support the integration of the WEU into the Union. In order to prevent this from occurring, the 
countries proposed the Union to integrate only the crisis management tasks of the WEU into the Union, 
something that took place in 1999. Preventing full integration may not have been the only reason, though. 
Finland and Sweden also received more influence in the WEU.6 Eventually, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy established with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty came to encompass the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) launched in 1999, although mainly dealing with crisis management. 
However, this was not the end of the defence integration process. The Union de facto incorporated the 
WEU in the 21st century. Although the envisioned Constitutional Treaty did not become a reality, the 
Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007 and in force since 2009, contained defence clauses similar to the 
constitutional draft, including those concerning Permanent Structured Cooperation, mutual assistance 
and solidarity. 7 
 
The mutual assistance clause obligates member states to assist each other in case of an armed attack, 
whilst the solidarity clause requires them to provide help in case of natural or man-made disasters. After 
critical comments from the militarily non-aligned states, the mutual assistance clause (42(7) of the Treaty 
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on European Union) came to include a provision outlining that “This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” The Irish politicians who needed 
assurances of maintaining their policy of neutrality raised the problematic in particular,8 and the treaty 
came to encompass a Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon. The Protocol 
stated that the (renamed) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) “does not prejudice the security 
and defence policy of each Member State, including Ireland, or the obligations of any Member State.”9 
Eventually, ever since the mutual assistance provision and the solidarity clause entered into force in 2009 
along with the Lisbon Treaty, all the EU member states have fully committed to them.  
In addition to the mutual assistance and solidarity causes, the possibility to establish Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) introduced in Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU provided a new measure to 
cooperate in the field of defence, though limited to a group of member states voluntarily cooperating in 
defence matters. The Lisbon Treaty even provided the possibility for establishing a common defence (as 
enshrined in Article 42(2) of TEU). However, this does not mean that the Union would turn into a military 
alliance; as reminded in a Resolution of the European Parliament, “certain EU Member States’ non-
membership of NATO should mean that they have different European Defence Union obligations.”10 
Despite the tools enabling deeper defence cooperation in the recent decade, the militarily non-aligned  
member state have not considered these steps to violate their military non-alignment.  
The Swedish approach to deeper defence cooperation seems somewhat reserved in light of the attention 
paid to the country’s military non-alignment. However, it appears that the Finnish approach has changed 
from a reluctant state to an active promoter of European defence cooperation. For example, in 2016, 
Finland started to promote the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation, beginning with a 
joint declaration with France.11 In November 2016, EU member states jointly called for the launch of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation,12 and the European Parliament also proposed adopting the PESCO 
and implementing the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.13 
Ahead of the June 2017 European Council meeting, Finland underlined the need to launch PESCO,14 
also repeated by the European Council, which agreed “on the need to launch an inclusive and ambitious 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).”15 In autumn 2017, the Finnish media also reported that 
Finland requested the addition of an entry on the mutual assistance clause into the notification on 
Permanent Structured Cooperation by the participating member states.16 In a parliamentary debate on 22 
November 2017, the Prime Minister also stated that Finland had announced to participate in PESCO 
among the first countries, contributed to the preparation with seven other countries and managed to pass 
the initiative on mentioning the mutual assistance clause.17 Indeed, one of the recitals of the notification 
                                                             
8 Karen Devine, “Neutrality and the Development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy: 
Compatible or Competing?,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (2011): 354. 
9 “Protocol on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon,” Official Journal of the European Union, March 2, 
2013. 
10 European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO Relations (2017/2276(INI)),” 
2018. 
11 France and Finland, “Declaration on Strengthening the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy,” June 15, 2016. 
12 Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on Security and Defence,” November 14, 2016. 
13 European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union 
(2016/2052(INI)),” November 22, 2016. 
14 Finnish Government, “EU-ministerivaliokunnan kokous linjasi kantoja Eurooppa-neuvostoon,” June 20, 2017. 
15 European Council, “European Council Meeting (22 and 23 June 2017) – Conclusions,” June 23, 2017, 5. 
16 Anniina Luotonen, “EU:n uuteen puolustusyhteistyöhön lisätään pykälä avunannosta,” Turun Sanomat, October 19, 2017. 
17 Finnish Parliament, “Täysistunto PTK 122/2017 vp,” November 22, 2017. 
reads as “Recalling the obligation under Article 42(7) TEU of mutual aid and assistance,”18 which links 
PESCO with the obligation to provide military aid, at least in the view of the leading Finnish politicians 
of the time.  
 
Both Finland and Sweden signed the PESCO agreement on 11 December 2017 and participated in various 
projects. The two countries participate in the project on military mobility, the so-called Military 
Schengen, but Sweden seems to be even more active in terms of actual participation: Sweden co-leads 
with France the project on EU Test and Evaluation Centres and also participates in projects on European 
Medical Command and European Union Training Mission Competence Centre. In December 2017, 
Finland outlined its intention to join also the projects on European Secure Software Defined Radio and 
cyber security.19 In addition to the projects outlined in its plan in December 2017, Finland decided to 
participate in the project on Integrated Unmanned Ground System, but unlike Sweden, it does not lead 
any of the projects. This seems a bit surprising given Finnish enthusiasm in establishing PESCO. 
 
The national approaches during the time of the establishment of PESCO reveal differences in Sweden 
and Finland. The Swedish Parliament held a full-scale debate on the matter and approved the Swedish 
participation in PESCO, framed to bring influence for Sweden and not to affect its military non-
alignment. In Finland, in turn, the government wanted to link PESCO to mutual assistance and wider 
defence cooperation, but still did not consider the issue significant enough to require a parliamentary 
approval. The main frames in Sweden and Finland are summarised in the table below, and the following 
sections examine the Swedish and Finnish approaches separately in more detail.  
 
    
 Finland Sweden 
Main frames in favour EU becomes a security 
community 
More effective defence 
spending and Swedish influence 
Threat frames related to 
PESCO 
May lead to federalism and loss 
of Finnish influence 
Erodes military non-alignment 
and militarises the EU 
Table 1. Main frames in Finland and Sweden with regard to PESCO. 
 
 
Swedish frames related to European defence cooperation: efficiency vs. military non-alignment 
 
The Swedish security policy doctrine relies on three issues, as outlined by the Foreign Minister Margot 
Wallström in spring 2019: “that we continue to be militarily non-aligned, that we develop our 
cooperation foremost with Finland but also with many other countries and even with NATO and that we 
strengthen our national defence capacity.”20 As already visible in this statement, defence cooperation 
with the European Union is not a primary issue for Sweden, but cooperation with Finland is the priority. 
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In contrast, as we observe in the following section, the Finnish approaches emphasise EU cooperation 
over bilateral cooperation with Sweden.  
Despite Sweden joining PESCO, the cooperation also continues to raise criticism. Much of the discontent 
presented in the Swedish parliamentary debates on PESCO consists of the opposition parties criticising 
the government initiatives, usually referring to the eradication of military non-alignment because of 
Swedish involvement in PESCO. The documents suggest that the frames in favour of PESCO rely on the 
expected Swedish influence in the EU foreign and security policy, i.e. based on pragmatic interests. 
However, we can see that the politicians who oppose to PESCO do so by relying on opposite frames: 
joining such a military cooperation scheme is allegedly in contradiction with the Swedish military non-
alignment.  
The Swedish government rarely brought up PESCO in the Parliament before publishing a Bill on the 
Swedish participation in Permanent Structured Cooperation on 22 November 2017, stating: “The 
Government deems that participation in PESCO provides Sweden with better requirements to widely 
influence the formulation and implementation of the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy. 
The Government further notes that the cooperation is intergovernmental and in accordance with the 
Swedish military non-alignment.”21 The Swedish Parliament held a vivid debate on the Bill on 6 
December 2017, and the debate started with concerns from the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party, 
who objected PESCO based on it eroding Swedish non-alignment.22 In addition to the said parties, even 
pro-NATO Liberal People’s Party was worried about the erosion of the military non-alignment, as was 
visible in the comment by the defence policy representative of the party, Allan Widman. He stated: “I 
am not saying that this integration is incompatible with upholding military non-alignment – it is very 
possible that it is all right – but I am worried that the Government does not understand how all this 
integration we have and we are planning affects how the world understands our military non-
alignment.”23 Eventually, only the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party proposed motions against the 
Bill and voted against it, resulting in 65 votes against and 241 in favour.  
 
After the establishment of PESCO, the Parliament has published two defence policy reports, one in 2017 
and the other one in 2019. The Swedish Defence Commission, which includes members from all eight 
parliamentary parties, drafted the reports. The largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate 
Party each have three members – whilst the other parties have one member. Sweden held parliamentary 
elections in between the two reports, in 2018, but the political balance did not change much as it is the 
Social Democrats and the left-green block that held the power during the publication of both reports. The 
first one is called Resilience: The total defence concept and the development of civil defence 2021–2025, 
which was published on 20 December 2017.24 The second one, in turn, published on 14 May 2019, relates 
more directly to defence already in the title Defensive power: the security policy direction and the 
development of military defence 2021–2025.25 The first report is a partial report focusing on civil defence, 
whilst the second one is a comprehensive defence policy report, also discussed in the Swedish Parliament. 
All eight parties provided dissentient opinions regarding certain issues, but signed the first report. What 
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is remarkable, however, is that only the government parties signed the 2019 report, and even this time 
all parties submitted a dissenting opinion on certain issues. The official explanation of the opposition 
parties for not signing the report was that they claimed that the government would not commit to the 
budgetary measures required in order to fulfil the requirements of the report, as they outlined in the 
parliamentary debate on the report.26 
The parliament published the 2017 Resilience report only a couple of weeks after it had approved the 
participation in PESCO, which may explain the absence of discussion thereof. The report merely stated 
that the EU has decided to launch such cooperation.27 The report neither mentioned military alignment, 
but the dissentient opinions from all opposition parties dealt with the topic. The centre-right parties 
(Liberals, Moderate Party and Christian Democrats) lamented the omission of military alignment from 
the report in their dissentient opinions. They stated that it is not credible to state that Sweden would not 
remain passive in case of an attack against EU or Nordic countries and expect similar actions from the 
other countries without being part of NATO. Their conclusion was that Sweden should apply for NATO 
membership.28 Sweden Democrats, in turn, considered that the government should clearly state that EU 
and NATO cooperation shall not threaten military non-alignment, as they considered that the recently 
approved PESCO does.29 The Left Party also declared that military non-alignment should be defended, 
which they considered the best guarantee for Swedish peace and security.30 
The 2019 Defensive Power report included more insights on PESCO, but only the dissentient opinions 
framed PESCO as a threat for military non-alignment, which also came up in the parliamentary debate 
on the topic on 10 June 2019. According to the report, the “Defence Commission deems that it is 
significant that the EU’s ability to act is strengthened and that Sweden has more active influence in its 
further development.”31 The frame attached to PESCO dealt primarily with the defence industry: “the 
member states will ensure that the funded PESCO projects strengthen the competitiveness of the 
European defence industry and avoid unnecessary overlaps.”32 In the dissenting opinions, only the Left 
Party discussed military non-alignment, deeming it important to maintain the credibility of military non-
alignment and stated that the “Left Party opposes to the recurrent initiatives of militarising EU 
cooperation through e.g. PESCO and military funds.”33 
Interestingly enough, the parliamentary debate on the 2019 report did not touch upon the subject of 
PESCO, and there was only a short debate about military non-alignment between MPs of the Left Party 
and the Liberal Party. The Left Party representatives considered that neutrality and military non-
alignment had guaranteed peace in Sweden, whereas the Liberal Party representative claimed that the 
exceptions to neutrality have actually been the measures guaranteeing peace.34 
Another document that is of relevance in the Swedish approach is the Statement of Government Policy 
in the annual parliamentary debate on foreign affairs. Unlike in the 2017 Finnish Defence White Paper, 
the 2017 Swedish Statement or debate thereon did not mention PESCO but referred to Sweden supporting 
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the European security and defence policy.35 In 2018 Statement, PESCO was considered to strengthen the 
operative capability and effectiveness of Sweden,36 but the Foreign Minister was the only one to bring 
PESCO up in the debate.37 The parliament held the most recent debate on 13 February 2019, and the only 
entry about PESCO in the statement is “We are contributing to the Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
which strengthens operational capabilities and effectiveness in the area of defence.”38 The parliamentary 
debate was also mostly about other foreign policy issues, but the Foreign Minister pointed out that 
participation in four PESCO projects is not meagre, as some opposition politicians had claimed, but the 
number of projects is the same that Finland participates in.  
It thus seems that the Swedish governments have considered PESCO to make defence spending more 
effective without representing a threat to the country’s military non-alignment. It is mainly those critical 
of PESCO and the government policy that suggest that military non-alignment is at risk. The government 
parties do not even appear to want to bring up military non-alignment when discussing EU defence 
cooperation. This may also relate to the framing of military non-alignment as more of a foreign policy 
issue rather than as a defence policy issue. 
Overall, it seems that the Swedish debate on PESCO and military alignment in the European context has 
been relatively minor, and the politicians frame PESCO mainly as enhancing cooperation in military 
procurement, which appears economically beneficial. It is primarily the Left Party that opposes 
militarising tendencies and the populist Sweden Democrats that bring up the question of military non-
alignment, though in a different light. The Left Party seems to want to have a credible non-alignment 
policy in order to promote peace worldwide, whilst the Sweden Democrats choose to emphasise Swedish 
sovereignty and thus oppose closer security policy cooperation with the EU and NATO. To sum up, most 
parties argue in favour of PESCO with frames based on efficiency, whilst a couple of opposing parties 
considered that PESCO is not compatible with the Swedish military non-alignment. The story, however, 
is a bit different in Finland, where military non-alignment rarely comes up with regard to PESCO. 
Instead, the politicians frame the risk of participating in PESCO in terms of federalism, as we observe in 
the following section. 
Frames related to European defence cooperation in Finland: security community vs. federalism 
As outlined before, Finland was very eager to promote the establishment of PESCO from 2016 onwards. 
Already in the 2017 EU Influence Strategy of the government published in December 2016, it was stated 
that “According to the Finnish view, [permanent structured] cooperation can deal e.g. with investments 
related to defence tools, and concrete measures strengthening the usability, cooperation ability, 
flexibility and operational readiness of troops.”39 Also the Finnish White Paper on Defence published 
in February 2017 outlined that “Finland promotes the development of defence cooperation within the 
European Union and supports the Union’s permanent structured cooperation and strengthening its crisis 
management planning and C2 [command and control] capability.”40 As we can see in these entries, the 
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government brought up the support for PESCO long before it was actually established. The Government 
framed PESCO in terms of general defence cooperation instead of merely a defence procurement issue. 
Since February 2017 and the planning of PESCO within the European Union, the Finnish Government 
has also provided so-called Foreign and Security Policy (UTP) letters to the Finnish Parliament on the 
development of the CSDP and the European defence cooperation, but many of the letters and attached 
memos are not publicly available. In May 2017, a memo appended to a letter stated, “The objectives and 
commitments required for joining PESCO need to be sufficiently ambitious in order for the cooperation 
to produce added value.”41 We can observe that the Finnish Government was more ambitious in 
developing defence cooperation and considered PESCO only the first step. The following memo issued 
in June 2017 ahead of a Council meeting outlined, “Finland supports ambitious progress in developing 
EU defence cooperation. The Finnish aim is that the concrete initiatives pave the way for a strong 
security community. The basic treaties enable deep-going cooperation in defence matters. Permanent 
Structured Cooperation is in accordance with Finnish long-term objectives and Finland hopes for the 
immediate launch of PESCO.”42 Despite such framing of PESCO as part of an ever-deepening defence 
cooperation, it is remarkable that the parliament did not hold a debate on PESCO nor approve the 
participation therein, but the government only brought the issue to the Parliamentary Grand Committee, 
which includes representatives from all government parties. The stance of the government was that it is 
in accordance with the Finnish interest to launch PESCO as soon as possible.43 
Permanent Structured Cooperation was discussed in parliamentary debates only a couple of times before 
its establishment. On 22 November, the Prime Minister announced topical EU matters in a plenary sitting, 
which included a couple of remarks on PESCO. There was a debate about PESCO and federalism, as the 
Finns Party and the Left Alliance claimed that PESCO is a step towards federalism and a common army 
and the government party assured that the cooperation is intergovernmental and does not reflect federalist 
tendencies. For example, the Europe Minister responded to a Left Alliance MP: “You brought up that 
Finland is committed to common defence and its development. Yes, because citizens wish it, and it is the 
government’s stance and a good stance. You brought up that the defence spending will rise. Yes, it is 
good. But you were factually wrong, as has already been mentioned, since this is not federalist 
development, but this permanent structured cooperation is cooperation among member states.”44   
The tone remained similar also after the establishment of PESCO. The Finnish Government did not frame 
PESCO only as a manner to make  defence procurement more effective but as a step towards deeper 
defence cooperation. This was also visible in a memo appended to the government’s EU Foreign and 
Security Policy letter on 22 February 2018: “Launching PESCO is a significant step in deepening EU 
defence cooperation and thus in accordance with Finnish long-term objectives.”45 The fact that many of 
such memos are not public and the minutes of the debates in the parliamentary committees for foreign 
and defence policy are not public suggests that PESCO is indeed considered to be a core defence policy 
issue that requires confidentiality. 
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Since PESCO was established, the Government’s EU influence strategies have referred to it, also the 
latest published in 2017, which outlines Finnish aims for 2018 and 2019. The 2019 aims were also further 
specified in the government programme of the new government. The 2018 strategy states: “PESCO 
strengthens, in accordance with Finnish long-term objectives, the EU as a security community and 
deepens practical defence cooperation. Finland’s aim is that in the future PESCO also strengthens the 
mutual commitments of the member states to mutual assistance, crisis resilience and emergency 
supply.”46 It is remarkable that the Finnish Government connects PESCO to the mutual assistance clause, 
which seems rather unique in the EU.  
Instead of being subject to a parliamentary debate, only parliamentary committees discussed the strategy. 
The Defence Committee hoped that PESCO cooperation leads to strengthening of the mutual 
commitments and solidarity between the Union countries.47 The representative of the Left Alliance was 
the only one to attach a dissentient opinion to the statement, criticising the costs of increasing defence 
cooperation and objecting to the militarisation and deepening of EU integration in defence. The main 
fear connected to PESCO seemed to relate to the cooperation being a step in a federalising process. 
Alongside the different frames related to PESCO, another interesting difference with regard to Sweden 
is that Finland decided early on to participate in the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2). 
The cooperation was launched on 25 June 2018 among nine countries (France, Germany, Denmark, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom), and Finland joined as the 
tenth partner on 7 November 2018. Sweden, in turn, only joined the initiative on 20 September 2019. So 
far, the countries have signed a letter of intent and “Terms of Reference”, instead of a Memorandum of 
Understanding as planned in the letter of intent. The initiative has a permanent secretariat in Paris and 
according to the terms of reference, “EI2 will not duplicate activities within the EU, NATO, UN, the 
OSCE or ad hoc coalitions, but will be complementary to them”.48 EI2 was not debated nor presented to 
the Finnish Parliament, but only to the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees, and the decision was 
made by the Finnish Government and President after meeting with the French President and Defence 
Minister in Helsinki on 30 August 2018. Even though the document only expresses mutual political 
understanding, it is significant that as a militarily non-aligned state, Finland was one of the ten EU 
countries to join such cooperation early on. When all ten EI2 countries participated in the Bastille Day 
Celebrations in Paris on July 14, 2019, the Finnish President further hoped for a deeper cooperation and 
anticipated that more states would join the initiative.49 The Swedish Government, indeed, joined the 
initiative on 20 September 2019, justified by the Swedish Defence Minister as strengthening their 
“possibilities of impacting the European security policy direction and policy development for crisis 
management”.50 
Although the actual actions with regard to defence cooperation do not differ much in Sweden and 
Finland, it seems that whereas the Swedish frames related to PESCO focus on the economic benefits of 
PESCO, Finnish leaders expect much deeper defence cooperation from PESCO. The Finnish frames 
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represent PESCO as a step towards a security community, whilst such aspects do not appear in the 
Swedish frames. Again, in contrast to the Swedish Government’s view, the (few) critical frames related 
to PESCO in Finland rely on the fear of federalism; that Finland could not decide autonomously on its 
defence spending. As discussed in the beginning, the frames related to EU defence cooperation in the 
two countries seemed to be more in line before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and the next section 
further analyses the observed differences. 
Finnish and Swedish politicians discuss PESCO on diverging levels 
If Finland and Sweden appeared to be in the same boat in the early 21st century in relation to the increased 
military cooperation in the European Union, this situation is no longer the same. Swedish politicians 
consider it important to ensure that their policies are not in contradiction with the Swedish military non-
alignment, though especially the opposition politicians arguing the contrary. In Finland, in turn, military 
non-alignment describes mainly the state-of-affairs of not being in NATO and it thus seems irrelevant to 
discuss it with regard to PESCO, or to have even a parliamentary debate and approval for the 
participation, for that matter. One should also be aware that Finland received a new centre-left 
government in spring 2019, and we do not know whether the policy will change in the coming years. We 
do not anticipate this based on the government programme, which states, “Finland actively participates 
in developing EU defence cooperation. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a central project 
related to EU’s defence dimension.”51 The government programme also reiterates that Finland is not a 
member of a military alliance, but ensures the credibility of its defence, inter alia, through security and 
defence cooperation within the European Union.52 The Swedish government statement from spring 2019 
in turn, states, “Our military non-alignment serves our country well. Sweden will not apply for 
membership of NATO.”53 These entries reveal that the governments of these countries, both currently led 
by the Social Democratic Party, also frame their military non-alignment differently; it seems to constitute 
a beneficial instrument for Sweden, whilst merely a declaration of the state-of-affairs for Finland. Unlike 
the Swedish Government, the Finnish one also mentions EU defence cooperation in the government 
programme first, even before bilateral cooperation with Sweden. In contrast, Finland constitutes the 
primary defence cooperation partner for Sweden, instead of European defence cooperation at large. 
Even though both Finland and Sweden decided to participate in PESCO, we can see that the employed 
frames are completely different. In both countries, the Left parties are the ones most vehemently opposing 
to the participation in EU defence cooperation, in addition to the strong opposition by the populist 
Sweden Democrats Party. This may relate to the differences in foreign policy stances. In Sweden, military 
non-alignment is still something that the governments uphold and reiterate in their policies, and it is thus 
safer to frame PESCO as an economically beneficial and strategically rational policy. The opponents, in 
turn, use the frames where one cannot uphold military non-alignment fully in such cooperation, being 
entirely aware of the importance of military non-alignment to the national foreign policy.  
In Finland, the situation is different. Even though the recent government white papers uphold military 
non-alignment, it does not have a similar historical trajectory as the Swedish one, and the politicians have 
not even mentioned military non-alignment in connection with PESCO. Instead of military non-
alignment representing an ideological view incompatible with PESCO, the opposing politicians frame 
federalism as taking place in such a defence cooperation. Rather than being incompatible with military 
non-alignment, federalism thus represents the negative ideological view to use in the criticism against 
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the policy. In contrast, the positive ideological view connected to PESCO seems to be the participation 
in the ever-deepening European security community.  
From the perspective of framing, the differences seem interesting. Swedish politicians frame PESCO in 
terms of national interest; the cooperation benefits defence economy and policy influence, or endangers 
the crucial interest of military non-alignment. This resembles the liberal intergovernmentalist idea of 
European integration furthering state interests.54 The Finnish framing, in turn, focusing on the increased 
defence integration as a positive or a negative issue, comes close to the idea of neo-functionalist 
integration spilling over to new fields.55 They thus seem to reflect differing frames of the integration 
process, at least in the field of defence. 
Conclusions 
I have argued in the article that even though both Finland and Sweden participate in PESCO, the 
politicians in the countries frame the cooperation differently. For Swedish politicians, PESCO seems to 
constitute cost-efficient cooperation in defence procurement, whereas Finnish politicians frame PESCO 
as a step towards a European security community. The Swedish Government explicitly mentioned that 
PESCO is not in contradiction with the Swedish military non-alignment, even though some opposition 
parties claim so. In Finland, however, military non-alignment does not come up related to PESCO, but 
the opposing politicians rather see the risk in PESCO leading to federalism. Overall, it seems that military 
non-alignment is of much importance in Sweden, which may explain why the government politicians do 
not want to contrast PESCO with military non-alignment but rather focus on defence procurement. The 
opposition politicians, in turn, know that defending military non-alignment is still a valid argument to 
employ when opposing PESCO. Finnish politicians, in contrast, seem to think that military non-
alignment is not a very efficient argument in trying to politicise the participation in PESCO, which is 
why the opponents try to frame PESCO with the fear of federalism against the government’s normative 
frames related to building a European defence community. 
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Abstract 
The article discusses how Swedish and Finnish politicians frame deepening defence cooperation in the 
European Union, in particular the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence. The empirical 
material consists of political documents and parliamentary debates from 2016 to mid-2019. By utilising 
frame analysis, the study illustrates that these two militarily non-aligned states frame PESCO in very 
different manners. The Swedish Government frames PESCO as an economically rational cooperation in 
defence procurement, whilst the opposing politicians see it as a threat to the Swedish military non-
alignment. The Finnish Government, in contrast, frames PESCO as a step towards a European security 
community, which the opposing factions consider a step towards federalism. Swedish politicians thus 
frame European integration in terms of national interests, but Finnish leaders discuss the process of 
European integration. 
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